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SOUI,NRE:-I V. COSTA
[32 C.2d 444; 186 P.2d 895]
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[Sac. No. 5842. In l:&nk. Aug. 24, 1948.]

EHNEST T. SORENSEN, Respondent, v. MANUEL COSTA,
Appellant.
[1] Adverse Possession-Law Governing.-A person claiming titll'
to property by adverse possession must establish his cbim
under either Code Civ. Proc., § 322, relating to occupation un-

l2]

[3]

[4]

)

[6]

[6]

der a written instrument or judftment, or under §~ 324, 321),
relating to possession under clllim of titlt' lIot written, Ilnd
where the deeds in '1ucstion do lIot illelutle the land occupied,
adverse possession thereof is governed 1,y §~ 1l24, 325.
ld.-Hostilit)'.-The requirmnent of "hostility" necessary to
establish title by adverse possession mcans not thnt the parties
lnUlit have a dispute as to the title during the period of possession, but that the claimant's possl'ssioJl must be adverse to the
record owner, unaccompanied by auy recognition of the owner's
right.
Id.-Hostllit)'-Occupation by Mistake.-Title by adverse possession may be acquired through possl'ssion or usc commenced
under mistake.
ld.-Duration of Possession-When Prescriptive Period Begins.
-Where adverse posaession is based on n mistaken entry, the
period of the statute of limitations commences to run, not from
the discovery of the mistake, but from the time of making the
adverse claim of right and possession thcrl'uudtlr. (Disapproving Maf'McanO v. Lu.fJing, 19 Ca1.App. 334, 336, 125 P. 10H3.)
ld.-Open and Notorious Character of Possession-Knowledge.
-A person claiming title by adverse possession Ill'tld not establish that the record ownllr kntlw of hjs own rights in t.he
land in question. Tho ndvel'se clnimnnt nend only I'how that
his occupation was such as to constitute reasonable notice to
the true owner thnt he clninlod the Innd itS his own.
ld.-Continuit)' of Possession-Tncking Successive Possessions.
-Where a person claiming title to lllnd by adverse pass"ssion

[3] Adverse posscssion dne to ignorance or mistake M to boundaries, Dote, 97 .A.L.R. H. See, also, 1 Cal.Jur. 578; 1 Am.Jur.
914.
[5] See 1 Oal.Jur. !l.1)(); 1 Am.Jur. 874.
McK. Dig.-=:&eferences: [1] Adverse Poss~S8ion, 13; [2] Advl'rs('
Possession, § 42; [3] Adverse POs!;t'ssion, § 51; [4] Adversp PIlI<,",ession, § 76; [5] Advcrfle PO""l'ssion, ~ 72; [6-8] Adver!!e PO,1~1'!\
$ion, § 85; [9] Ad\"c~(' Pos;;r.~~ion, ~ HiR; [lll, 13] Adv"rsp. Po.,,·"ssion, § 102; [11, U] Adverse Post;cflsion, § fo)6i [12] Taxl:Ition, ~ 167.
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did Dol hiw~l'lf ptl~S~SS or oel~up'y I III' lund rl)r five yearll, it j,..
for him to rl'ly 011 thr. Jl(Js~I'ssions of his pr('d('ce!l~or.'
to ('stnhlisb continuoull PO!lsf'IIKion for th" prcserib('d pl'rio<1.
Ilnd in order to tack on(' p(!rson'f' posllcslIion to thut of anoth!'}',
1I0B1l' form of privity b(·two·I·n 811<!CI'RSiVI' ~laimant8 for such
perioll is neCl'lls8r,;°.
[7] 1d.-OontiDuity of Possession-Tacking Successive Possessions.
--A privity of estRte neCI!lIliary to tuck the adverse PO::l':I!'.8sion
of the clnimnnt to that of hi!' predcce!lllors may be supplied by
mcalls othur than thos" of deeds describing the property.
(Di&opproving Batler \'. K"ight, 86 Cal.App. 347, 351, 260 P.
nI!CI!s~nry

942.)

/

(8] 1d.-OontiDuity of Possession-Tacking Successive Possessions.
-TJ,\· privity nuClt.'ssary to support the tacking of succeR.livr
poss(!I,.ion~ of property may be ba8t'd on any connecting rel:lo
tioDf1hip which will prevent a breaen in the adverse posse';liion
and reInr thE- several posIIC'ssiorui to the original entry, and no
titlt, or p written agrc·I.'ID!'nt of any kind is necessary if aetual
possession is trnnl.lferred.
[9] 1d. - Evidence-SuJli.ciency-Continuity of Possession.-In an
action to quiet title to land, althou~h a tinding that the land
W8.!i conveyed by deeds mistakenly describing the property
did not alone support the conclusion that the privity necessary
to tack successive possessions existed between plaintiff and his
predecessors, the tindiDf:! did support the conclusion that plaiDtiff's predecessors intended to b'ansfer the land, and evidence
that possession was actually transferred to each successive
occupant during the five-year period supported the conclusion
thatplainti1f and his predecessors were in continuous possession for the statutory periodo
[10] Id.-PaJDlen1i of Tues-Evidence--8trl1iciency.-In an action
to quit't title to land, the evidence, particularly the fact that
the laud was assessed as improved property whereas the description on its face referred to a vacant lot, supported the
court's detfo.rmination that the description was mistaken and
that plaintUI and his predecessors actually paid all taxes assessed for the statutory period on the land.
(11] Id.-PaJDlent of Tues.-The fact that land was not assessed
by its description is Dot controlling under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 325, where the adverse claimant and his predecessorI' paid
the taxes assessed for the statutory period on the land that
they occupiedo
[12] Taxation - Assessment-Description of Property.-The purpose of the description of land on the tax assessment rolls iii to
notify interested persons of the taxes due on the property,
and a person cannot complain of any mistake in the description
where he was not misled or injured thereby.

I
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[IS] Advene Possession - Payment of 'l'axes - Evidence - 8u!lciency.-While a pr.rson claiming tit1e hy adverse possession
must show that he and his predeeessorR act.uRlly Pllid the taxes
aSRPssed on the particular land occupied, and ht' cannot show
compliance with Code Civ. Proc., § 325, by merely proving that.
he and his predecessors thought or supposed thpy were paying
taxes on the land occupied by them whell the lands were
assessed under a correct description that applied to otht"r land,
eompliance with the code section is shown by substantial evidence that the description on the tax assessment rolls was
mistaken and that he and his predecessors paid taxes actually
assessed against such 1ands.
[14] Id.-Parment of 'l'ues.-Where a claimant of title by adverse
possession has paid the taxes actually assessed on the property
occupied, a misdescription on the tax assessment roll or in the
tax receipts will not generally affect the eflicacy of payment
under statutes requiring the payment of taxes in order to
establish title by adverse possession.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Solano
County. Joseph M. Raines, Judge. Affirmed.
Consolidated actions to quiet title to real property. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Ernest C. Crowley for Appellant.
Morse &; Richards and Stanley C. Smallwood for Respond-

ent.

/

TRAYNOR, J.-Appellant, Manuel F. Costa, appeals from
a judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent, Ernest T.
Sorensen, determining the latter to be the owner of· it lot described as "The Westerly one-half of Lot 7, Block 51,
Benicia, California, as the same is laid down and delineated
on the Official Map of the City of Benicia."
According to the evidence and the findings of the trial
court, this litigation arose out of n "general mistake exi~ting
as to the proper description of several lots lying in and upon
block fifty-one as shown on the Official Map of the City· of
Benicia, California." For m:m.y years appellant and at least
threc-:of his ncillhbors living in Block 51 had been occupying
land other than that (l~s(:ribl'd in their deeds. In 19·10, it was
[14J Tax payments by nih-c)'''' ,·I:lilllnnt, note, 132A.L.R. 216,
227. See, R180, 1 Cal.Jur. 562; 1 Am.Jur. 927.

J
/

456

SORENSEN tI. COSTA

discovered that the actual boundarics of the lots occupied
by appellant and his neighbors were approximately 75 feet,
or one-half a lot's width, to the west of the land described
in their respective deeds. Thus, appellant had been living
for over 40 years in a house on a lot that is actually the east
half of Lot 8, but which his deed describes as the west balf
of Lot 7. His next-door neighbor, respondent, has a deed describing the east half of Lot 7, but he has been occupying a
house on land described in appellant's deed, the west half of
Lot 7. Nettie Connolly has been in possession for many years
of property that includes the east half of Lot 7, which is unimproved land, and the west half of Lot 6. Her deed, however,
describes the whole of Lot 6. The east half of Lot 6 and the
west half of Lot 5 together constitute corner property occupied by Francis Little, but his deed describes the whole of
Lot 5, a large part of which is a street.
At a tax sale in September, 1940, appellant purchased land
described as the east half of Lot 8. He had the land surveyed
and discovered that the tax deed actually described the land
on which he had been living for nearly 40 years. A dispute
subsequently arose between appellant and respondent with
respect to the land occupied by respondent but described in
appellant'8 deed, and respondent brought this action to quiet
his title to the land in question on the ground that he had
acquired title thereto by adverse possession. By a subsequent
amendment to his complaint he also sought reformation of his
deed. Appellant filed an answer and cross-complaint and
secured an order to bring in new parties, including E. E. Rose
and Bessie C. Rose, who claim an interest in the land in question under a deed of trust. Meanwhile, respondent also brought
an action against Nettie Connolly claiming title under his
deed to the east half of Lot 7. The actions were consolidated
for trial. Judgment was entered for respondent quieting his
title to the land occupied by him, namely, the west half of
Lot 7, subject to the deed of trust in favor of E. E. Rose and
Bessie C. Rose; the judgment also determined that Nettie
Connolly owns the land occupied by her, namely, the east
half of Lot 7. No appeal has been taken from the part of
the judgment quieting title in favor of Nettie Connolly.
In 1890 L. B. Misner executed a deed to Lot 7 to E. F. Albee
and F. M. Carson. Shortly thereafter the grantees exchanged
deeds, dividing the lot between them. Carson received a deed
describing the east half of Lot 7. and Albee received a deed
describing the west half. In 1901, Albee executed a deed to

~
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Manuel Costa likewise describing tht' west half of Lot 7, but
Costa took possession of the east half of Lot 8 and has resided
thereon ever since.
In 1893, E. M. Carson executed a deed to Nicholas Nelson
describing the east half of Lot 7. Similar deeds were executed
by Nelson and his successors in interest, including a deed executed in 1928 by H. C. and Myrtle Glass to George Costa, the
son of appellant, who occupied the land until 1936, when he
transferred possession to E. E. Rose and Bessie Rose and
executed a deed in their favor likewise describing the adjoining land. In 1938, E. E. Rose and Bessie Rose executed a
like deed in favor of Nicholas Kadas and Josephine Kadas.
The land was in possession of tenants of Nicholas and Josephine Kadas in March, 1940, when they executed a deed in
favor of respondent, Ernest T. Sorenson, likeWise describing
adjoining land. The tenants remained in possession, paying
their rent to respondent until the termination of their tenancy,
about six months later, when respondent went into possession.
The trial court found that c. for more than forty years last
past, and prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff
Ernest T. Sorenson and his predecessors of title, have been in
actual possession" of the property in question; that "from
the year 1898, to the date of the commencement of this action,
due to the mistake of the several Grantees and Grantors of
said real property, the same has been mistakenly described
in the several conveyances thereof, including the conveyance
to plaintiff herein, as the East one-half (E lh) of Lot Seven
(7), Block Fifty-one (51), City of Benicia, California, instead of the west one-half (W lh) of Lot Seven, Block Fiftyone (51), City of Benicia, California."
With respect to the payment of taxes, the trial court found
that for many years "and partictllarly during the five year
period prior to the commencement of this action, the real
property hereinabove described . . . has been described on
the tax assessment roDs of both the Oounty of Solano, and
the Oity of Benecia, Oalifornia, as the East one-half (E lh)
of Lot Seven (7) Block Fifty-one (51), City of Benicia, Oalifornia and that all taxes assessed by the County of Solano
and Oity of Benicia, California, against said property have
been assessed against plaintiff, Ernest T. Sorenson and his
predecessors in possession and occupation of said real property . . ." The court also found that both appellant and
respondent and their predecessors •• have .paid all of the

)
I
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taxes assessed by the City of Benicia and the County of Solano,
against the properties actually occupied by them."
In addition, the trial court found that respondent" and his
preuecessors in interest have since the 19th day of Aliril, 1890,
been in actual possession" of the property in question .. and
have ever since the last date ... occupied, used and cultivated said land, having and keeping the sam£' surrounded
by a substantial enclosure, using and claiming the same in
their own right from that date to the present time adversely,
to all the world. "
[1] A person claiming title to property by adverse possession must establish his claim under either section 322 or
under sections 324 and 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Adverse possession under section 322 is based on what is
eommonly referred to as .color of title. In order to establish
a title under this section it is necessary to show that tbe
elaimant or "those under wbom he claims, entered into possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other
rigbt, founding such claim upon a written instrument, as
being a conveyance of the property in question, or upon the
decree or judgment of a competent court, and that ther£' has
been a continued occupation and posst>ssion of the property
included in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some
part of the property . . . for five years . . . so included.
• • ." Since the deeds in question did not include the land
occupied, adverse possession thereof is governed by sections
324 and 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Park v. Power.,
2 Ca1.2d 590, 594 f42 P.2d 75].)
.Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
" [w ] here it appears that there has been an actual continued
occupation of land, under a claim of title, exclusive of any
other right, but not founded upon a written instrument., judgment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and DO other, is
de£'med to have been held adversely"t Section 325 provides
that "For the purpose of constituting an adverse poss£'RSion
by a person claiminl! title, not fonnded upon a written instrument, judgment, or decrt>e. land is d£'emed to have been
posses~ed and occupied in the folJo,ving cases only:
(1 ) Where it has been protected by a snbstantial inelosure.
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
·'Provided, howev£'r. that in no cas£' shall adv£'rse poss£'ssion
be (!onsidf'red pstablislH'd llndpr th£' proyi!:ions of any section
or st'ctio1Jsof this code. nnl('ss it shaUbe shown tlIat the land

Aug. 1948}

SOHENREN tJ. CosTA

459

(32 C.2d 453; 196 P.:kI 800]

bas been occupied and claimed for the period of five years
continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and
grantors, have paid all the taxes, !'Itate, county, or r.lUuicipal,
which have been levied and assessed upon such land."
The trial court found that the land was occupied continuously by respondent and his predecessors for more than Ih·o
years; that throughout that period it was prot~cted by :1 Rubstantial enclosure and usual1y cultivated; and that :ill tht'
taxes assessed thereon had been paid hy respondent :md his
predecessors. AppelJant contends, however, thnt respondent
is precluded, as a matter of law, from cstabJishin~ title by
adverse possession. Appel1ant's contentions ill t,his regard mny
bE' classified under the fonowin~ beadings: (1) That the
mutual mistake of the parti('s precluded respondent from
establishing the adverse character of the pOSllcssion of tile
property by him and his predecessors; (2) that the bet that
the deeds held by respondf'nt and hi!! predC'cesc;ors froiled t.o
describe the lund in question precluded him from showing
continuity of possession for thp 8tat11tory period; (3) thnt
respondent did not prove thnt he find his predN!(,sSOl'R p!lid
all the taxes assessed on the land in question during the
statutory period.

)

THE ADVERSE CHARACTER OF TJtE POSSESSION

:)

!

/

Appellant contends that as s nt.'\tter of L'\w respondent
could not have acquired title by adverse posc;cs.'Iion because the
mutual mistake of the parties for the fltntutory period p~
eluded respondent from showinr. t11nt thl! posscssion \I:as haRtile or adverse to the rights of the record owner••\ sir.rllnr
contention was rejected by this court in Waadtcard v. F'ari&,
109 Cal. 12, 17 [41 P. 781}. [2] The requirement of "hostility" relied on by appellant (see West v. EtJ4tl8, 29 Cal.2d
414, 417 [175 P.2d 219]) means, not that the parties must
ha ve a dispute as to the title durinlr the period of pos.'Icssion,
but that the claimant's posscssion must be ndverse tl) th.>
record owner, "unaccompanied by nny recognition, express
or inferable from the circumstnnCt.>S of the rill'ht in tIl(" latter."
(4 Tiffany, Real Property faded.), 425.) Appellnnt's ~Oll
tention that respondent's possession WIlS not adverse is bnSl'c\
on the Rtntemcnt in Holzer v. Read. 216 Cal. 119. 123 f13
P.2d 697], that "wlll'refllC' oe('lIpation of Innd is by Ii ll!r-re
mistake, and with 11.0 illt(!11tion on the 1>m·t af fhr occ1t7Jfmi ff)
claim as his oum. lImd which (lops not b<:,long to him. hnt with
the intention to claim only to th(· I rnc line wherever it may be,

)
l

460

./

)

SORENSEN fl. COSTA

[32 C.2d

the holding is not adverse." (Italics added.] Thllt Nt.:lt'!Jnl'ut
js not applicable to the present CRSe, for th~ trial court iound
on the basis of substantial evidence that respondent amI his
predecessors did claim the land as their own and held it
"adversely to all the world." The Holzer case involved a
different situation, Ii dispute as to boundaries, that turned on
the question whether the occupier in occupying up to a certain
line intended to claim the land included in the record title
of his neighbor or to claim only whatever land was described
in his own deed. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 322, 324.) The
trial court found that he intended to claim only the land deflcribed in his deed, and this court affirmed the judgment on
the ground that in the absence of an intention to claim the
land in dispute as his own, his possession was not adverse. On
t.he other hand, in Woodward v.FaN, ntpra, 109 Cal. 12, 17,
this court expressly held that if the claimant intends to claim
the area occupied as his land, the mere fact that the claim was
based on mistake does not preclude him from acquiring title
by adverse possession. [8] Since the Woodward case, it has
been an established rule in this state that U Title by adverse
possession may be acquired through the possession or use
commenced under mistake." (Park v. Powers, supra, 2 Cal.2d
590, 596; Lucas v. Provines, 130 Cal. 270, 272 [62 P. 509] ;
see ~ Cal.Jur. 578; cases from other jurisdictions collected,
97 A.L.R. 14, 58; 4 Tiffany, Real Property [ntpra], § 1159;
1 Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of Real Property, § 19.)
[4] Nor is there any merit to appellant's contention that
if adverse possession may be based on a mistaken entry, the
period of the statute of limitations runs only from the discovery of the mistake. Appellant relies on Breen v. Donnelly,
74 Cal. 301, 305 [15 P. 845] and a dictum in Marsicono v.
l.1uning, 19 Cal.App. 334, 336 [125 P. 1083]. The case of
Breen v. Donnelly, supra, is not in point. for it involved the
application of the statute of limitations to an action for relief
on the ground of fraud or mistake under section 338 (4) of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Section SS8 (4) provides that in
such a case the cause of action for purposes of the statute of
limitations is deemed not to accrue until the discovery of
facts constituting the fraud or mistake. The section is an
express exception to the general rule that the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action actually accrues.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 312.) A cause of action for the recovery
of real property aeeru~ when the owner is deprived of pos..... ion. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 318,321.) "Occupancy for the
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pcriod prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficicut to bar any aetioll for the recovery of the property confers a titk thereto ... sufficient against all . . . . " (Civ.
Codc, § 1007.) The dictum in Marsicano v. Luning, 19 Cal.
App. 334, 336 [125 P. 1083], that the period of adverse possef.sion does not commence to run until the discovery of the
mistake, must be disapproved, for it is not only inconsistent
with the statut~ of this sta1c but is directly contrary to the
holding of this court in W vodward v. Faris, supra, 109 Cal. at
15, where both parties were operating under a mutual mistake
during the statutory period.
[6] Appellimt also conttmds that the mutual mistake precludes respondent from showing that his possession and that
of his predecessors was under "such circumstances as to constitute reasonabl", noticc to the owner." (Wed v. Evans,
supra, 29 Ca1.2d 414, 417.) App~lll\.nt has evidently misconstrued the foregoing langual!'e to mean that a person claiminJ!
title by adverse possession must establish that the record owner
knew of his o",n righbl in the lund in question. All that the
claimant must show, however, is that his occupation was snch
as to constitnte reasonable notice to the true owner that he
claimed the land 88 hi8 own. The fnc.. t thnt the record owner
was unaware of his own right...; in the land is immaterial.
(Wood v. Davidson, 62 CnLApp.2d 885, 889. [145 P.2d 659J;
McLeod v. Reyu, 4 Cal.App.2d 143, 157 [40 P.2d 839] ; Montecito Valley Co. v. Banta Barbara, 144 Cal. 578 [77 P. 1113;
additional eases collected, 1 Cal.Jur. 550; 4 Tiffany, Renl
Property, supra, § 1140.) In the present ease there can bt· no
question under the findings of the trial court that the occupation of respondent and his predecessors wus such as to C(Institute
jown. reasonabl~ notice that thoy claimed the land as their

-)

CONTINlnTY OF POSSESSION

/

[6] Under section 325 of the Cod" of Civil Procedure, rl'spondent was required to prov", that "the land had been occupied and claimed for the period of five years continuously."
Sinct! respondent did not h.im8elf possess or occupy thtl land
for five years, it was nt'cessary for him to rely on the possessions o{ his predecessors to establish continuous possession for
the five-year period. In order to tack one person's possession
to that of another, some form of privity between successive
claimants for the five-year period is necessary. (Ban Francf'sco

462
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Ji'uZde,37 Cal. 349.853 [99 Am.Dec. 278] ; Meier v. Meier,
71 Ca1.App.2d 502, 507 (162 P.2d 950].) Appellant contends
that respondent failed to establish the necessary privity.
The trial court found that respondent "and his predecessors
in title, have been in possession and occupied the west one-half
(W lh) of Lot Seven . . . by virtue and under deed describing their said property as the East one-half (E lh) of Lot
Seven. . ... " from the year 1893 to thc datc of thc eomm~nce
ment of the action.
The trial court found tha.t respondent and "his predecessors in title n have been in possession of the property in question by virtue of deeds mistakenly describing the propurty
as the east one-half of Lot 7 for more than the statutory period
and that the land in question \\'~ conveyed to plaintUf and his
predecessors by dt.-eds describing the adjoining property. Since
respondent's claim of title by adverse possession cannot be
based on a written instrument, it Ulllst be supported, if at all,
under Code of Civil Proctldure sections 324 and 325, which
do not require a written instrument. The question remains
'fI.'hat privity other than that based on a deed describing the
land will supply the necessary continuity of po~ssion between
respondent and his predecessors for the five-year period preceding the commencement of this nction.
[7] Relying on Mc:sser v. Hwernia Samngs Society, 149
Cal. 122, 128 (84 P. 835]. and V Otl N eind.orll v. Schallock, 2]
Cal.App.2d 44, 48 [68 P.2d 278], app~llo.nt contends that ollly
a deed deareribing the land claimed will supply the necessary
privity. Although the cases rdied on contain statements to
that effect, the actual holdings are not inconsistent with thl'
view that privity may be supplied by other moans. In both
cases the claimant attemp~d to support his claim of OOV\lr&c
possession by a deed excluding the land claimed, and it \VauI
beld that such deeds did not supply the necessary privity. In
the Von Neindorff case, 81£pra, 21 Cal.App.2d 44. 48. the court
stated that a person claiming title to land by adverse possession •• cannot tack to the time of his possession that of a pr~
vious holder where the land claimed adversely was not included
within the boundaries of the conveyance he received from such
previous holder. tt The court stated as the reason for this rule
that "otherwise a person receiving a conveyance of a part
of lands occupied by a predecessor might use th(> possl'ssion
of that predecessor of another part of the land to d~f('.nt the
rigbts of that predecessor with l'CSPCCt to that part of tlw land
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which he intended to keep for himself. The rule is particularly appropriate in a case such as this where the land, the
predecessor's possession of which is relied upon, was particularly excepted from the conveyance made by the predecessor."
This statement of the reason for the rule and its application to
the facts of the Von Neindorff and Messer cases shows that
the rule was too broadly stated in those cases. The reasonint:l'
supports, at most, a rule designed to protect the claimant's
pr(.de<:l~l:isor where he transfers by deed a part but not all of
the land he possessed. It h3li no application to a situation
where the deed dcscribl!s none of the land posscSl:icd by the
claimant's predecessor and the predecessor has transferred
possession and attempted to transfer title to all of the land
that he possessed. In such a situation the deed to land posRcsscd by neithcr the prl!Scnt claimant nor his predecessors
docs· not preclude a cL'lim by the person in possession to the
lnnd occupied.
Appellant r\}lies also on "Wen v. McKay cf: 00., 120 Cal.
332 [52 P. 828], :md Saner v. Knight, 66 Cal.App. 347 [260 P.
942]. The court's only comnll'nt rl'lcvantto the problem of
privity in the Allen case, however, is that "it may be further
suggested that a privity of estate is absolutely nec('Ssary before
various periods of "dverl:il! POSsc's.'>ion Cl'eatl;d by different
parties mny be tllcked togl~ther, und, as to the land in controversy, thl! existence of such prhity . . . is not entirely plain."
The court did not define the term ,. prhity of estate," and
there is no reason to assume that the eourt intended to usc
this term as restricted to privity between transferel'S by deed.
(See Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possess-ion, 32 IIarv.L.Rcv.
185, 147.) In Saner v. Knight, 66 Cal.App. 347, 351 [260 P.
942], it W:18 held th:~t deed'! describing the property were sufficient to establish the privity nectlSSary to tack the adverse
possLossion of the claimant to that of his predecessors. Although
the court assumed t.hnt. privity might not bc. establish~d by
othcr means, :my l:mguage in the opinion Rupporting such a
rule was unncecssary to the decision in that case and is disapproved.
[8] The requirement of privity between several possessors
of land is bnscd on the theory that "The several occupancies
must be so· cODDC"cted that each occupant can go back to the
original entry or holding as a source of title. The successive
occupants must elaim through and under their predecessors
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and not independent1y to mal\e a continuous holding unitp.d
into one ground of action." (Ballantine, supt'a, 32 Harv.L.
Rev. 135, 147.) For this reason it is generally hcld that the
plivity necessary to support the tacking of successive possessions of property may be based upon "any connecting relationship which will prevent a breach in the adverse possession
and refer thc several possessions to the origInal entry, and for
this purpose no written transfer or agreement is necessary."
(4 Tiffany, Real Property, supra, 434; Illinois Steel Co. v.
l'aczocka, 139 Wis. 23,28 [119 N.W. 550] ; Gregory v. Thorrez,
277 Mich. 197, 200 [269 N.W. 142] ; Bonds v. Smith, 143 F.2d
369, 371; cases collected 46 A..L.R. 792, 795; Ballantine, supra,
32 Harv.L.Rev. 135, 147-159;5 Thompson on Real Property
[Perm. ed.], 468; 1 Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of Real
Property, supra, § 23.) "It is possession not title which is vital
• . • privity may exist where one by agreement sUITenders his
possession to another in such manner that no interruption or
interval occurs between the two possessions without a recorded
conveyance, or even without writing of any kind if actual
possession is transferred. " (Bonds v. Smith, supra, 143 F.2d
369,371.)
[9] In the present case, although the finding that the land
in question was conveyed by deeds mistakenly describing the
property does not alone support the eonelusion that the privity necessary to tack successive possessions· existed between
respondent and his predecessors, it does support the conclusion
that respondent's predecessors intended to transfer the land in
question. There is no question that the evidence before the
trial eourt showed that possession to the land in question was
actually transferred to each successive occupant during the
five-year period. It therefore folloWR that the conclusion of
the trial conrt. that the respondent and his predecessors were
in continuous posses.cdon for the statutory period must be
sustained.
PAYMENT OF TAXES

/

/

The trial eourt found that the land occupied by respondent,
the west half of Lot 7, is improved land, whereas the east half
of Lot 7 described in respondent's deed is unimproved, and
that through a general mistake, thc improved lot occupied by
respondent" has been generally known and described in and
about the City of Baneeia" as the cast half of Lot 7, an un·
improved part. of the propert.y occupied by Nettie Connolly.
The (~lIur1 found that this same mistake was made on the
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assessment rolls and that the propcrty occupied by respondent
has been described in the tax assessment rolls of both the city
and county as the east balf of Lot 7 and assessed to respondent
and his predecessors as improved property. The court therefore determined that respondent and his predecessors have
paid all the taxes that have been assessed on the property
actually occupied by them for the five-year period before the
commencement of the action.
[10] Thus, all interested persons have mistakenly believed
during the statutory period that the description of the land
and improvements on the tax assessment rolls referred to t.he
land occupied by respondent, when, in fact, the description
erroneously referred to certain unimproved property. The
evidence before the trial court, particularly the fact that the
land was assessed as improved property whereas the description on its face referred to a vacant lot, supports the trial
court's determination tbat the description was mistaken and
that the respondent and his predecessors actually paid all
taxes assessed for the statutory period on the land that they
occupied.
[11] Appellant contends that the description on the tax
assessment rons is controlling, and that as a matter of law
the respondent must have paid taxes only on the land described
on the assessment rolls. This court has held, bowever, tbat
the fact that land was not assessed by its description is not
controlling under section 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(Ward Redwood Co. v. Fortain, 16 Ca1.2d 34, 44 [104 P.2d
813].) [12] The purpose of the description on the tax assessment rons is to notify interested parties of the taxes due on tbe
property, and appellant cannot complain of any mistake in
the description unless be was misled thereby. (San Francisco
v. San Mateo Oounty, 17 Cal.2d 814, 819 [112 P.2d 595];
E. E. ltfcCalla Co. v. Sleeper, 105 Cal.App. 562, 567 [288 P.
146] ; Biaggi v. Phillips, 50 Cal.App.2d 92, 98 [122 P.2d 619) ;
see also Lmnmer v. Unruh, 25 Cal.App. 97, 103-104 [142 P.
914].) Since appellant as well as other interested parties at
the time the taxes in question were assessed also understood
that the taxes related to the property occupied, he could not
have been misled thereby. Hc was not injured by the mistake
in the description, for at the time he did not know that he had
any C'laim to the land in qupstion and paid taxes on the propert~· hr wa~ orrl1}1ying a~~rs.<;pn lmnPT n similar mistakC' in
descriptiun. [13] App<,lJant (~oJlteJlds, however, that reo
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spondent cannot rely on his own mist akt' and that of his prede.
cessors as to the payment of taxes on the wrong land. There
is no question that a person claiming title by adverse posses·
sion must show that he and his predecessors actually paid the
taxes assessed on the particular land occupied, and he cannot
show compliance with section 325 of the Code of Civil Pro·
cedure by merely proving that he and bis predecessors
"thought or supposed they were paying taxes" on the land
occupied by them, when the lands were assessed under a correct description that applied to other land. (Standard Quicksilver 00. v. Habtskaw, 132 Cal. 115,124 [64 P. 113] ; Reynolds
v. Willard, 80 Cal. 605, 608 [22 P. 262J.) In the present case,
however, the respondent proved by substantial evidence that
the description on the tax assess:c.ent rolls was mistaken and
that he and his predecessors not only thought that they were
pa.ying taxes on the land occupied but in fact paid taxes actually assessed against such lemds.
Appellnntalso relies on certain cases involving boundary
disputE'.s betwctln adjoining landowners, in which the courts
have denied ciaulis of titl~ by advcrst', possession up to the
boundaries of the land occupied, on the ground that the claimant faiJed to establish payment of taxes on the disputed part
of the occupied land by tax receipts that failed to describe
the land. (Sel! Freidman v. Southern Calif. T. Co., 179 Cal.
266 [176 P. 442J ; Mann v. Mann, 152 CaL 23, 29 [91 P. 994J ;
Wilder v. Nicol.a1Is, 50 Cal.App. 776 [195 P. 1068]; Johnson
v. But1t, 7 Cal.App.2d 197, 202 [46 P.2d 771].) In none of
these eases, however, docs it appear that the claimant showed
that the' descriptions on the tax recciptc; were erroneous and
that he actually paid the taxes assessed on the land in controversy. [14] Where a claimant of title by adverse possession
has paid the taxes actually asse.st!ed on the property occupied,
a misdescription on the tax assessment roll or in the tax reccipts will not generally affect t.he efficacy of payment under
HtatuteS requiring the payment of taxes in order to establish
title by adve]'l;e possession. (W cst Chicago Park Commi.~
sioners v. Coleman, 108 Ill. 591, 598; W. D. Clcvdand &- Sons
v. Smith (Tex.Civ.App.), 156 S.W. 247, 251; cases collected
2 C.J .S. 752; 13~ A.L.R. 216, 227.) Even if the descriptions on the tax receipts arc iusufficil'nt hy themselves
to identify thl' property, as far as the rc.quirllll l 'uts of adverse
possession arc involved, the claimant lllay ~how by other cvi·
dence that til{' particular lanel occupied was u~!'n:scd, and the
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taxes were paid by him or his p"l'dccl""-'1ors. (S('(' Bmnr.ll v.
Lee, 373 Ill. 333 [26 N.E.2d88] ; ace also Lttm'mcr v. Unruh,
fltpra, 25 Cal.App. 97, 104:.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schnut'l', J. t
and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant'. petition for a reheariDg was denied September
20,194:8.
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